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7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

SUBJECT: Area Considerations in the Development
of a National Cold War Strategy: the
Near East

REFERENCE: TS# 66360 Memorandum from Acting Assistant
Director for Policy Coordination to Chiefs
EE, FE, NE, SE, WE, SR, and WH; Dated
20 February 1952; Subject: "Instructions
for the Preparation of an Area Analysis
Contributing to the Formulation of a
National Psychological Strategy".

In accordance with the reference memorandum there is
attached herewith NEA Division's background paper for use
in the formulation of a national psychological strategy
by the Psychological Strategy Board.

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Chief
Division of Near East
and Africa

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AREA CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT

OF A NATIONAL COLD WAR STRATEGY:

THE NEAR EAST*

(1) Major Issues of Conflict Between the Soviet Bloc and the West
in the NEA Area

Excluding the primary and self-evident conflict between the Soviet bloc and the West, namely, the struggle between Soviet expansionism and Western efforts to achieve the forthright alignment of the Near East with the nations of the free world, the following issues embrace the major sources of conflict between the two spheres with respect to the area:

(a) Nationalism, colonialism, and policy towards dependent
peoples.

With the resurgence of nationalism in the Near East, the USSR has made vigorous and relatively successful efforts to appear as the champion of the national aspirations of the Near Eastern peoples and as a major exponent of the reduction of foreign influence and control in the Near East. The United States and the West, on the other hand, although more sympathetic and responsive to national

* The term Near East will be used herein to designate the entire area under reference: namely, the African continent; Egypt, Syria, Lebanon; Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, the dependent territories of the Arabian peninsula; Turkey; Iran; South Asia, embracing India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Nepal, Tibet.

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aspirations in this area than the USSR, frequently have been forced by strategic, political, and prestige considerations into a position of apparent resistance to nationalist movements for the sake of maintaining their own interests in the area. The West is even more vulnerable with respect to the dependent territories of the area, where, despite certain concessions in the direction of self-government, particularly by the British (e.g., in Nigeria and the Sudan), we have frequently been put into the public position of giving only lip-service to the concepts of self-government and independence for dependent peoples. Our public record of resistance to the local aspirations has even included efforts to prevent appeals by dependent peoples for a United Nations hearing, as in the case of Tunisia. Of the Western powers, the United States has been subjected to particular censure by the Near Eastern peoples by virtue of its traditional support of the principle of self-determination. On this entire issue, the USSR, uninhibited by any position of direct responsibility within or for the area, will continue to enjoy considerable latitude.

(b) Racism.

An important issue of conflict throughout the area, but particularly in Africa and South Asia, is that of racism. This issue, which is particularly applicable to the United States among the Western powers, is also one on which the USSR is in position to capitalize in the area at our expense, with more justification than in the nationalist colonial issue. In Africa and South Asia, which are deeply sensitive on the question of color, the USSR is
able to

able to capitalize on its "equality of treatment" for all races and colors within the USSR, while it has successfully exploited genuine and alleged discriminatory practices in the United States.

(c) Collective security arrangements and base rights.

Western efforts to advance collective security arrangements affecting portions of the area, namely, the extension of NATO to include Turkey, and the proposed creation of a Middle East Command, have been vigorously resisted by the USSR through diplomatic and propaganda pressures and through intimidation tactics directed against the Western powers and against the Near Eastern states concerned. Similarly the USSR has been extremely vocal on the question of Western base rights within the area. In the latter case, the USSR has made effective use of anti-imperialist slogans, identifying itself with the growing demands of the Near Eastern peoples for a reduction in foreign control, occupation, and influence. Thus, as with the nationalist-colonial issue, the United States and the West have been placed in an invidious position by their security and related requirements.

(d) Economic development and technical assistance.

Our efforts to advance the economic well-being and development of the Near East in the interests of enhancing its stability are opposed by the Soviet bloc on grounds of "economic penetration" and "economic imperialism". Although the countries of the area are sensitive to any possibility of such penetration or imperialism, on

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the whole the tangible benefits of our programs, together with the Soviet record of exploitation of its satellites and its failure to offer assistance to the Near East and other underdeveloped areas, renders its position less effective on this issue than on the foregoing.

(e) "Asia for the Asians"

Despite our efforts to convince the peoples of Asia that we respect their independence, that they bear primary responsibility for solution of their problems, and that we neither desire nor are capable of assuming direct responsibility for solution of their problems, the Soviet bloc has met with considerable success in championing the concept of Asia for the Asians and in masking its own intervention under the guise of "indigenous" communist movements. This issue has worked to the Soviet advantage particularly in India among the Near Eastern countries, which is deeply sensitive over the vestiges of Western colonial control in Asia, resentful of what it considers our disregard for the legitimate aspirations of a vast portion of the Asian peoples (notably in Communist China and French Indo-China), and uncritical in its interpretation of some of the communist controlled conflicts and disturbances now in train in Asia as genuine expressions of nationalism. The USSR has scored some of its most conspicuous success in playing upon the "Asia for the Asians" theme.

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(2) Prevailing conditions which tend to nurture and improve the Soviet position with respect to the achievement of Soviet objectives.

(a) Economic instability and social unrest.

The widespread illiteracy, poverty, and misery of the masses, and their bare subsistence level of existence, are fostering a rising tide of social discontent which finds expression principally in nationalism of both a legitimate and an irresponsible nature. This social discontent is assuming a genuine revolutionary character which, although in part artificially stimulated, has already demonstrated its ability to get out of hand. Because of the broad interrelations which exist throughout the area, based on religious, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, or political affinities, moreover, the growth of nationalism in one part of the area gives impetus to its development elsewhere in the area. A supplementary factor, but one of actual and potential importance, is the emergence of a vocal and articulate population group, particularly among the urban proletariat, liberal groups, intelligentsia and students, and labor elements, which is capable of accelerating the revolutionary trend. At the same time, the masses of the population cannot be counted on to offer any significant resistance to communism, because of their belief that any way of life is likely to be an improvement over their present existence. The opportunities which this situation offers for communist manipulation and exploitation are almost unlimited.

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(b) Political ineptitude and irresponsibility.

In general, the corrupt, ineffectual, or inexperienced governments of most of these states have failed to keep pace with the growing requirements and demands of their peoples or to adopt active measures to alleviate economic distress and social injustice. This situation is aggravated because of the area-wide lack of administrative and technical experience, and of natural resources and capital plant. In view of the fact, moreover, that most of the executive and legislative bodies of the area are composed of the vested interests of the country, few reform measures have been enacted which would infringe upon or adversely affect the personal economic status and privileged position of the governing authorities. The political and economic structure in most of the Near Eastern states is semi-feudal; the power is held almost exclusively by rightist, conservative, or reactionary leaders, with little opportunity for liberal elements to obtain representation in the government; and the latter generally lacks any broad basis of popular support. Numerous political leaders in the area have exploited anti-Westernism, nationalism, and xenophobia to divert the popular attention from their own failure to act in the public interest.

(c) Attitude towards the West.

There exists throughout the area widespread disillusionment, suspicion, and antagonism towards the West, which most of the Near Eastern states consider has demonstrated insufficient interest in their welfare, or which they fear is attempting to maintain or

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extend its economic or political influence at the expense of their sovereignty or to involve them in the Soviet-Western conflict for reasons of self-interest. These attitudes have been accentuated by bitterness over certain of the policies of the West affecting the area, such as Western policies towards the Palestine and the Kashmir problems, in which vast numbers are convinced that we have acted counter to their best interests. Taken in conjunction with the widespread upsurge of nationalism, these anti-Western attitudes have been accompanied by anti-colonial, anti-imperial, and xenophobic slogans, and particularly by demands for the reduction or expulsion of foreign influence and control. While these demands have been addressed primarily to the British and French up to the present time, they have also been accompanied by reluctance to enter into closer association with the United States on technical assistance programs, economic development, and military aid programs. In addition, the Near Eastern states have displayed at once a distrust of what they regard as "dollar diplomacy" on the part of the United States and a highly critical attitude over our failure to extend assistance to them in a volume commensurate with their wishes or needs. From another point of view, moreover, the governments of these states have also seized upon the slogans of anti-colonialism, anti-Western, and anti-imperialism as means of extracting political, economic, or military concessions from the West. Because of the vulnerability and weakness of these countries, and their desire to remain aloof from what they regard as a struggle

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between two rival alien power blocs, many of these states pursue a policy tending towards neutralism or dissociation with either bloc, which retards the development of a forthright alignment with the West for collective security purposes. Finally, one major international factor which enhances the Soviet potential is the policy divergencies existing at the present time between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with respect to the area. (See para. 8)

(d) Attitude towards the USSR and Communism.

Near Eastern leaders display a disinterest in or lack of critical appreciation of the true nature of Soviet and communist strategy and tactics or have an unrealistic appraisal of their own ability to counter Soviet or communist tactics. On the part of the population at large, communism, while not understood, is generally interpreted as aimed at improving the lot of the poor and oppressed masses. Both governments and people, moreover, are so preoccupied with their own problems that they tend to minimize or ignore the Soviet threat. Because of failure to appraise the Soviet threat realistically, and because of political opportunism, certain ultra-nationalist or rightist extremist elements have the capability of entering into a marriage of convenience with communist elements to achieve their ends, while some of the governments, motivated by the desire to play off the Soviet Union against the West, might be tempted to seek an association or understanding with the USSR from

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which withdrawal might be difficult or impossible. An additional factor working to the Soviet advantage is the broad affinities which exist between certain of the Near Eastern peoples and the peoples of the contiguous Soviet republics, affinities of a social, ethnic, and religious nature, as well as comparable living standards

(e) Impediments to area cooperation and stability.

Because of preoccupation with regional or international disputes, and because of dynastic rivalries, competing nationalisms, intra-governmental ^t factionalism, and the lack of continuity in government, these states have proved reluctant to enter into regional arrangements for collective security and/or economic development purposes which could enhance area stability. Moreover, the intra-regional disputes, notably the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, and the Afghan-Pakistani dispute over the frontier tribes, have debilitating effects on the countries concerned, arising from the financial and psychological burdens of maintaining large military establishments at the expense of economic stability and development.

(f) Psychological weaknesses and susceptibilities.

The absence of national cohesiveness, patriotism and public responsibility, together with political opportunism, constitute regional weaknesses which render large numbers susceptible to subversion, bribery, or manipulation. Because of the volatility and undisciplined character of popular emotions in the area and the responsiveness of the Near Eastern peoples to demagoguery, they are

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capable of violent outbreaks of religious or nationalist fervor which, as in Iran and Egypt, are capable of being artificially stimulated and of getting out of control very easily.

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(3) Conditions which significantly impede or menace the Soviet program.

(a) Military Arrangements.

Military arrangements in and affecting the area constitute the most important instrumentality impeding and menacing the Soviet program of expansionism. In addition to firm control over their African dependencies on the part of the Western powers, and special British treaty relations with the principalities of the Persian Gulf, the British maintain a net of mutual defense treaties with Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Ceylon, and Egypt, although the latter is currently under strong attack. The existence of American, British, and French military, naval and air bases throughout the area, and the presence of Western military and naval units constitute important deterrents to Soviet adventures in the area. Moreover, the extension of the NATO to include Turkey, as well as its application to French North Africa, and the proposed establishment of a Middle East Command further extend our security commitments with respect to area defense. (In the case of the Middle East Command, which Egypt has rejected, there are now grounds to hope that Egypt may be prepared to reverse its position. In this event, the other Arab states, which responded favorably to the original proposals, would be prepared to participate). In the area, moreover, which is vital to the Commonwealth in peace as well as war, security is strengthened by the readiness of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa to contribute to its defense in time of war. Finally, the most important single factor in deterring Soviet expansion is the relatively greater role which the United States is now playing

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in the Near East, which is made explicit by our present and proposed security commitments with respect to portions of the area, as well as by the commitments implicit in our military and economic aid programs therein.

(b) Political and international factors.

Three groups offer significant resistance to the expansion of communism. First, throughout the Near East, the political power is held almost exclusively by moderate, conservative, or rightist elements who, at the same time, control the bulk of the economic wealth of the area. These elements will resist any threat to their political or economic position and will make strenuous efforts to maintain themselves in power. From the short term point of view, this factor is the most important practical deterrent to the extension of communism in the region, and one of the major modalities through which we can work to attain our cold war objectives against the USSR. Two other groups are of secondary importance in resisting the advance of communism. First, in the Near East, where the strength of organized religion is influential, important religious groups and organizations are opposed to communism on an ideological basis. Second, many of the individualistic and semi-autonomous tribal units are in large measure opposed to communism from a social point of view.

At the present time, the main political trend in the area is towards the right, rather than the left, and an increasing influence is being exercised by religio-political groups of the extreme right.

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(India, however, is an exception to this trend, as was demonstrated in the recent elections which showed continued support for the moderate socialist government party, a decline in the strength of the extreme rightist elements, and a marked upswing in the relative strength of leftist elements). A further factor which works to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, although only from the short-term point of view, is the semi-feudal structure of a large portion of the area, which makes possible the exercise of a considerable measure of control over a large proportion of the peasantry by the land-owning classes. In addition, the general absence of an ideological bent on the part of the population, save in the Indian subcontinent, impedes communist penetration on an ideological basis.

A number of factors in the international posture of the Near Eastern states also have a bearing with respect to impeding the Soviet program, although in a more general sense. All the governments of the area, despite their political coloration, are non-communist in character. In general, as a result of long-standing and close political, economic, and cultural ties with the West, moreover, these countries have a closer affinity of interests in practice with the West than with the Soviet Union, although this fact should not be overestimated. British influence and prestige, although diminishing, remain a source of stability and indirect control. In addition, United States interests in the area, political, economic, commercial, and military, have increased significantly in the past few decades. This increased activity and participation in the affairs of the area has in general been welcomed, and a considerable

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and a considerable measure of confidence in the intentions and motivations of the United States exists throughout the area. This underlying trust and confidence in the good will of the United States constitutes one of our major assets in the Near East, but one which cannot be taken for granted or counted upon to provide uncritical support for our actions. The area as a whole, moreover, is dependent upon external assistance for economic development and military aid, and has preferred to seek such assistance from the West. In the peripheral areas of the Near East, notably in Iran, Afghanistan, and in militantly anti-Russian Turkey, there exists a traditional fear of Russian expansionism. Moreover, the trends towards neutralism, disinclination towards alignment with either power bloc, and resistance to foreign influence also work against the Soviet Union as they do against the West.

(c) Economic conditions

There exists little opportunity for any significant Soviet or satellite economic penetration of the Near East, since the vast bulk of the area's economic relations and financial ties are with the West. Similarly, the greater portion of its imports and exports originates in or are destined for Western bloc countries, while all the major air and surface transportation facilities within and traversing the area, are owned and operated by Western interests. All petroleum concessions and installations in the area are owned by Western companies. Even with respect to Iranian oil, where the possibility of Soviet and satellite purchases now exists, the limited tankerage facilities available to the Soviet bloc renders it impossible for the bloc

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for the bloc to become an important outlet for Near Eastern petroleum products. (It should be noted that a measure of direct trade with the USSR is carried on, particularly with respect to northern Iran and Afghanistan. However, since Russia is the natural and historic outlet for such trade, the dislocation which would result from its curtailment would outweigh the advantage gained thereby.)

(d) Social conditions

Apart from those factors included in the foregoing, the influence of religion throughout the area - Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism - constitutes a certain deterrent to the extension of communism in the Near East, although this is a factor which, against the background of the basic social and economic deficiencies of the area, is frequently overestimated. However, the religious bonds between the Moslem peoples of the Near East and of neighboring Soviet republics, and the ethnic bonds between various minority groups in the Near East and the Soviet Union suggest the existence of a significant psychological potential in the Near East through exploitation of the treatment by the USSR of its religious and ethnic groups contiguous to the Near East.

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(4) Principal communist vulnerabilities with respect to the Near East.

For the most part, these vulnerabilities are covered in paragraph (3). In the Near East, which is deeply sensitive to the issue of colonialism, the Soviet brand of colonialism, and the nature of the USSR's treatment of the satellite states and its economic despoliation thereof, as well as the favorable aspects of the record of the Western powers on colonial questions, are inadequately understood, and offer significant possibilities for development. As corollaries to this theme, the USSR's treatment of its minority peoples, its Asian peoples, and its Moslem peoples within the Soviet Union offer major fields for psychological exploitation. To a lesser extent, the irreligiousness of the Soviet Union is a source of vulnerability as well. However, in developing any of these themes, their effectiveness will depend upon the degree to which they can be presented explicitly, concretely, in terms which the Near Eastern peoples can understand, and,, to the extent possible, by indigenous media and by people or people native to adjacent areas.

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
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
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- (6) (a) Major strategic factors which now block or cripple Western efforts in the Near East.

The strategic vulnerability of the Near East as a whole presents a major obstacle to the success of Western efforts in the area. Because of the ease with which the area can be overrun, present war planning is based on the assumption of a Soviet invasion of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran on or shortly after D-day, and their occupation, along with the western shore of the Persian Gulf, within six months after D-day. Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan will be under attack and subject to possible occupation. The ease with which these portions of the area can be invaded and the lack of any prospects for significant resistance, except in Turkey, Pakistan, and India are, moreover, reflected in the attitudes of the countries concerned, since they are doubtful of Great Britain's ability to carry out its responsibilities with respect to the defense of the Near East and fearful that the United States plans to abandon them to their fate in the event of war or is unwilling to make a defense commitment adequate to hold the area. These considerations condition their attitude towards the West and towards the Soviet Union, even in peacetime. Subsidiary factors in the situation are, first, the progressive increase in Iran's weakness, which prevents the development of a mountain defense line along the Turkey-Iran-Pakistan axis, and, second, the strengthening of Turkey's defense potential, which invites the Soviet Union to bypass and isolate that country in invading the area.

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The lack of bases and facilities from which to launch psychological warfare and other operations into the Soviet bloc continues to inhibit Western efforts. In this connection, the attitude of the United States Government towards the question of acquisition of base rights leaves much to be desired. Despite our need for such bases and facilities, and our potential ability to negotiate them successfully in a number of Near Eastern countries, the inflexibility of the United States Government with respect to compensation therefor has resulted in critical delays in our defense program as well as resentment on the part of the countries concerned over what they regard as our haggling and lack of generosity. Another inhibiting factor has been a tendency on the part of the United States Air Force to pursue an independent course of action, as in Libya and Ceylon, where it has endeavored to initiate action with respect to acquisition of base right without reference to other agencies of the Government. The political and other disadvantages of such action are obvious.

The delay in establishing the proposed Middle East Command, because of Egypt's rejection of the four-power invitation to participate and the unwillingness of the other Arab states to associate themselves with the Command prior to settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, has inhibited Western defense efforts. Another disadvantage, namely the prevailing suspicion in the Near East with respect to our partners in the Command, the British, French, and Turks, is perhaps outweighed in the minds of the Near Eastern governments by the prospect

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of United States participation. However, there are obvious advantages in the early establishment of the Command, particularly with regard to training facilities and materiel to strengthen the weak forces of the area, and with regard to the possibilities for area cooperation, which would not be limited to military cooperation, which exist in the Command proposals.

Finally, with respect to oil, there are two considerations which potentially affect Western efforts in the Near East. The first is the physical vulnerability of the oil installations and facilities of the Near East, which poses the problem of the cost of the military effort required in terms of feasibility, time, and materiel, and the forces required, to insure the continued availability of oil from the Saudi Arabia-Bahrein-Qatar area in the event of war. The second is the political vulnerability of the oil concessions, and means of insuring the flow of oil both in peace and in war against the whims and pressures of the concessionary nations.

(b) Adverse factors susceptible to favorable alteration by Western manipulation, and techniques which might be applied.


The entire problem of the strategic vulnerability of the Near East is one which can be approached, short of war, only through the media of our proposed Mutual Security Program missions and particularly through the Middle East Command. While the latter cannot be expected to achieve ideal effectiveness, because of limitations on the commitment of significant American forces and material in support of the program

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of the program, and because of the inherent weaknesses of the Near Eastern states, nevertheless it offers favorable possibilities in terms of training and equipping potential resistance forces and in
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efforts. However, establishment of an effective command structure is predicated on solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which in turn,

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The means of removing the obstacles to our acquisition of base rights are largely self-evident, since they are in large measure attributable

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Attributable to the United States Government. There is required within this Government a clear recognition of the significance to the countries of the Near East of according us such privileges, which are or can be regarded as intrusions upon their sovereignty, as measures which may disturb their precarious economies or diminish their control over their populations, or as provocative action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Accordingly, while a number of these countries would be prepared under certain circumstances, in wartime or in advance of war, to accord us such privileges, we must be prepared to provide an adequate quid pro quo, which might vary from insistence on reciprocal defense commitments, as in the case of Turkey, to insistence on reasonable financial assistance and appropriate rental fees, as in the case of Libya. There is required an increased understanding of the need for greater flexibility and generosity in negotiating base rights, both to avoid critical delays in our defense program and to avoid the resentment which arises in the countries concerned from what they regard as haggling and a niggardly approach. Finally, there is required full coordination within the United States Government, which has been lacking hitherto, in order to assure that the State Department will have a free hand to carry out its primary responsibility for negotiating such base agreements, that it will be provided with means of compensation through adequate appropriations by the Defense Department,

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Our ability to insure the continued availability of Near Eastern oil in wartime will be dependent upon the degree of our willingness to commit forces and air protection, a subject which is under study in behalf of the NSC at the present time. Our ability to insure the continuing validity of Western concessions in the Near East is dependent largely upon diplomatic measures, both through counselling the Near Eastern governments to exercise moderation in any moves towards for concessionary revisions and through urging the concessionary companies to make appropriate concessions to the countries concerned. However, the nature or absence of an oil settlement in Iran, and the resultant improvement or deterioration of Iran's economic position, will have a significant effect upon the character of existing concessions elsewhere in the Near East.

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(7) Existing potentialities in the Near East requiring vigorous reinforcement for maximum exploitation.

An important potentiality lies in the inherent friendship and traditional ties which exist between the Near Eastern states and the West. These assets, which have been reduced and diluted by disillusionment with the West because of our past policies with respect to such questions as Palestine, Kashmir, our support of the French in Indochina, our ambiguous position with respect to self-determination for dependent peoples, our failure to provide economic and military assistance in proportion to the desires of the Near Eastern states, and the like, require vigorous reinforcement if they are to be exploited fully. Our assistance programs will serve in some measure to reinforce this potential, but in essence the rebuilding of confidence in the West will necessitate long and patient effort and a reexamination of our policy towards the Near East (see paragraph 8).

The resistance potential within the Near East, which exists both in the regular armed forces of certain of the countries and also in a number of the militant tribes of the area, requires vigorous reinforcement. Although Turkey, Pakistan, and India are the only countries capable of offering any significant resistance to attack, the regular armed forces of Israel and Jordan could also be utilized in limited resistance activities. In addition, tribal elements, particularly in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Libya are capable of being formed into guerrilla units or elements of resistance for the defense

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for the defense or liberation of the area, provided personnel and equipment are made available for training purposes. Establishment of the Middle East Command will provide an important vehicle for such training services, while the military missions used in support of the Mutual Security Program in general will offer possibilities for bilateral cooperation even if establishment of the Command should be further delayed.

The small, and largely inarticulate forces of liberalism in the Near East required significant reinforcement. Up to the present time, and for the foreseeable future, we are compelled in the interests of short-range stability to support those elements who now hold the power in the Near East, while recognizing that our long-range objectives would best be served by the growth of more liberal and progressive forces aligned with the West through common ideals rather than through the present associations based on narrow self-interest. It is, accordingly,

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The religious potential also requires reinforcement. It is necessary both to endeavor to reinforce the repugnance of the Near Eastern peoples towards the anti-religious posture of the Soviet Union, and to endeavor to strengthen the community of ideals which exists between the Near Eastern religions and those of Western civilization. In so doing, it will be necessary to strengthen the influence of the moderates

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moderates within the Near Eastern churches, rather than to work exclusively through the more articulate and politically powerful religious extremist groups.

The concept of economic development and technical assistance for backward areas is one which has a powerful appeal to the Near Eastern states, and one which should serve the United States objectives therein. However, it will be necessary vigorously to reinforce our existing programs, particularly by demonstrating progress along these lines before we will be in position to reap some benefits therefrom. This will probably necessitate placing relatively greater emphasis than hitherto on projects selected for their immediate effectiveness, projects located in important urban centers, and the like, rather than educational and other projects which would have an impact only after a long period of time.

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(8) Alteration in existing strategic policy and establishment of new policy required to insure conditions prerequisite to successful cold war operations in the Near East.

A broad re-examination of our national policy with respect to the Near East is called for, with a view to clarification of our relations with the British and the French in matters affecting the Near East, and of our respective responsibilities. The paper now under consideration by the NSC, "The Position of the United States with respect to the Area comprising the Arab States, Iran, and Israel", which was originally designed to clarify the United States and British roles, appears wholly inadequate and equivocal in this regard. 's a result of our failure to establish an equilibrium between the problem of our relations with our British and French allies and that of our relations with the Near Eastern states, our national policy has been characterized by reversals, hesitance, vacillation, and grudgingness, illustrated in our frequent contradictory actions with respect to Palestine, despite our stated policy of pursuing a neutral course; in our response to the Indian foodgrain request; in our varying and expedient interpretations of the principle of self-determination; in our shifting position on Arab refugee repatriation, and the like. Whether a course of identification of American policy with that of Britain and/or France is decided upon, or one of relative independence and of support for the national aspirations of the Near East, or one based on a division of the area into spheres of influence, the decision should

should be made

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Should be made at the earliest opportunity and then adhered to with consistency and a measure of logic. As a corollary to this problem, a re-examination and redefinition by our highest military authorities of the respective defense roles of the British and the United States with respect to the Near East would appear to be warranted. Another specific aspect of this general problem is the need to clarify our policy with respect to Israel vis-a-vis the Arab States, and then to demand unqualified adherence thereto, by all branches and officials of the Government, in an effort to avoid in the future such actions as Congress' raising the proposed Israeli assistance program to equal that proposed for all the Arab States. Still another aspect is the need to clarify our views with respect to the principle of self-determination, within the framework of reconsideration of our policy vis-a-vis the British and French. This would particularly affect our future actions with respect to French North Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

It would also be desirable, with respect to existing and future NSC papers affecting the Near East, further to refine and define the policy principles set forth therein, as a more precise guide to future action and to take account of probable future developments in the area. At the present time, most of the NSC papers relating to the Near East consist largely of principles drafted so broadly that it would be possible within their frame of reference to pursue diametrically opposed courses of action.

Our existing

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Our existing programs for technical assistance and economic development are now entangled in the current shifts in organizational and administrative authority within the Government. Moreover, these programs are in danger of becoming wholly ineffective, because of the basic divergencies between those officials charged with carrying out political policy, who seek early implementation of assistance programs to have a maximum effect in the current cold war period, and those officials who are specialists in technical assistance per se, who are striving to carry out programs of an extremely long-range nature, with little reference to the exigencies of the international situation. If the latter approach is adopted and carried out, there seems little likelihood of utilizing our economic aid programs in support of our national political and strategic objectives in the Near East, where time is of the essence and immediate, tangible impact is of more importance than a program directed towards curing the basic ills of the Near East over a long period of time.

On the question of future legislation, it would be desirable to take into account the restrictive aspects of the Mutual Security Act, in its requirement for assurances from countries receiving United States military assistance. While such commitments are highly desirable in all cases where they are politically feasible, nevertheless our inability to make military aid available without them in a crisis situation might well result in an irreparable breakdown in internal security, for example, in Iran or in Egypt. Legislation should therefore be

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amended to give the Government discretionary powers to make an exception in this regard wherever it is overridingly in the national interest to do so.

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- (9) External influences which have a significant impact upon the outcome of our strategic approach to problems in the Near East.

Certain favorable external factors exist. As a result of the loss of China, the outbreak of the Korean War, and the development of the Iranian and Egyptian crises, there has been a growing appreciation on the part of the Congress and the American public of the strategic importance of the Middle East. This growing recognition of our strategic interest and the readiness of the Congress to support military and economic assistance programs therein is steadily increasing our capacity for effective action in the area. A second factor is the willingness of France, Great Britain, and certain of the Commonwealth nations (Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa) to share responsibility for the defense of the area. A third, through lesser factor, which works to our advantage has been the favorable repercussions arising from our invocation of the collective security concept in response to the attack on Korea, which has given the Near Eastern states grounds to hope for collective action in the event that they are attacked. A fourth has been the Chinese Communist aggression against two Asian peoples, the Korean Republic and Tibet, which has served at least in small measure to bring the realities of communist intentions home to the Near Eastern governments.

Unfavorable factors also are influential, however. Distrust of French and British intentions in the Near East, and the decline in British and French prestige have already been discussed. A second factor

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factor is the disillusionment over the strength of American power as a result of the Korean War, since respect for strength per se is a major element in the Near Eastern psychology. This has also accentuated the existing lack of confidence in the United Nations, which, however, was significant even before Korea, largely because of United Nations inability to deal with the Palestine and Kashmir problems in accordance with the wishes of all the parties concerned. Finally, failure to respect Near Eastern sensibilities on the part of the American public and certain American officials, as evidenced in highly critical statements concerning the Arabs on the part of officials sympathetic to Israel, and in the efforts of elements in the Congress to make political capital of the Indian request for foodgrains to alleviate the 1950 famine is a serious impediment to the progress of our strategic approach.

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- (11) Courses of action which can be taken within the next twelve months in the Near East. 25X1C

The courses of action enumerated below are not set forth in order of priority, since a number of them are complementary or interdependent, while others require prior resolution of international disputes or high-level policy determinations before they can be fully implemented. Moreover, it would be misleading to indicate priorities by country, since internal circumstances frequently inhibit our ability to act, regardless of the urgency of the problems. In this context, for example, we have greater capability and scope for emergency action in Egypt than in Iran, despite the equally critical nature of the problems in the latter country.

(a) Courses of action.

During the next twelve months, we propose to pursue the following courses of action:

(1) Action to combat and counter communism.

We propose to continue and expand our efforts to keep existing communist forces under control, or to reduce their present strength, through such tactics as the use of counter-propaganda, 25X1C

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